Empire Rising: Spain

Compared to the ”Minimum Income Law for Workers” from a few years ago, this latest version of the Minimum Income Law is significantly more robust in terms of income protection.

Even the weekly wages of child laborers are guaranteed to be above 90 copper coins, which is higher than the weekly wages of Spanish female citizens over 50 in the previous income law.

The substantial increase in child laborers’ income is mainly intended to support those impoverished families who have no choice but to let their children work.

Carlo may allow capitalists to exploit workers to a certain extent since it benefits factory production, contributes to Spain’s industrial construction, and promotes economic development.

But if capitalists attempt to exploit child laborers, Carlo wouldn’t mind letting them experience the might of the Spanish judiciary.

The interests of child laborers must be safeguarded, with a daily work time not exceeding ten hours and one day off per week as Carlo’s bottom line.

This latest ”Minimum Income Law for Workers” was crafted with reference to Spain’s per capita income. The economic conditions of various regions in Spain are not the same, and thus the minimum income in each region fluctuates to some extent.

However, such fluctuations only consider the problem that people in more economically developed areas should receive higher incomes, and thus any adjustments to the minimum income law in various regions are only allowed to increase, not decrease.

The successive revisions of laws regarding the protection of workers’ interests have completely quelled the public anger caused by workers’ protests.

Again, the Spanish public still trusts the Spanish Government. Their anger was solely directed at the capitalists’ exploitation of workers, and they were not significantly dissatisfied with the government.

After the government consecutively amended the labor laws, the public only had satisfaction and admiration for the government, leaving no room for dissatisfaction or opposition.

Carlo and Duke Serrano, who led the amendments to the labor laws, also received adoration and praise from the Spanish public.

A few days later at the Madrid Royal Palace, Carlo met with Canovas, who had become the Deputy Prime Minister of the Provisional Cabinet.

The ones who benefited most from this rebellion, besides Carlo who gained governmental power, were Duke Serrano who became the Prime Minister and Canovas who became the Deputy Prime Minister.

Anyone with keen insight could see that Duke Serrano becoming the Prime Minister was only transitional, and Canovas would undoubtedly formally assume the role of Prime Minister thereafter.

The reasons are simple. Firstly, Duke Serrano, at the age of 65, didn’t have enough energy to become the controller of the Spanish Government.

Additionally, Duke Serrano already possessed high prestige in the military and had served as Spain’s Minister of Defense for two terms since the revolution.

If he were to become Prime Minister again, wouldn’t his prestige rival that of former Prime Minister Prim? Carlo, who had finally seized the opportunity to power, wouldn’t allow the emergence of another Prime Minister Prim.

This very thought led many parliamentarians and officials to believe that Canovas, who didn’t have much prestige in the military, would ultimately become Spain’s Prime Minister.

Carlo thought the same, not out of concern about Duke Serrano, but because he believed that the younger Canovas was more suitable to become Spain’s Prime Minister.

Born in 1828, Canovas was currently just 47 years old. In the position of Prime Minister, Canovas clearly was in his prime, having ample time and energy to manage Spain’s affairs.

Moreover, Duke Serrano, being 65 years old already, wasn’t skilled in politics and economic development, which was why he let Prim become Prime Minister after the revolution and became the Minister of Defense himself.

Allowing Canovas to take over as Spain’s Prime Minister would mean, because of his prime age, he could cooperate with Carlo for two terms, totaling ten years.

Such a long-lasting period of governance is an invaluable developmental stage for the current Spain. The concern is that too frequent regimes’ changes could cause a country with the potential for rapid development to fall into stagnation due to the alternation of power.

Historically, Spain during this period underwent similar issues due to internal turmoil and frequent regime changes. After Queen Isabel came the Provisional Government, followed by Amadeo I, then the Republican Government, and finally Alfonso XII.

During this period, regardless of whether it was the three kings or the Provisional and Republican Governments, Spain’s Prime Minister and President positions never had truly stable candidates.

This resulted in Spain historically having almost no stable space for development during this time and missing out on a golden period for development, thus leading Spain into irreversible decline.

Carlo would not repeat the same mistake. Unless the Spanish Prime Minister had issues with loyalty, Carlo wouldn’t consider changing Prime Ministers too frequently.

Of course, if there were competence issues, a change would be necessary. After all, only a competent Prime Minister could drive the country’s development, whereas one lacking capability would only worsen the situation.

Meanwhile, Spanish political parties and parliamentarians were concerned with reorganizing Parliament and holding new elections, while Carlo was worried about handling the large tracts of land acquired after the confiscation of noble properties.

Speaking of which, even if almost a hundred noble participants in the rebellion, they only made up a tenth of Spain’s noble class.